In every battle fought with India, Pakistan had to hold the lines, obliterate the tanks and protect national borders. Years have passed, and we still instinctively remember those wars as a story of soldiers, sacrifice, and territorial resolve. The dilemma is that the strategic environment in which those soldiers fought has changed absurdly and is no longer what it was decades earlier. Now nuclear arsenals have left limited space for large-scale wars and typical conflicts lie below the threshold of total war. States contest in cyberspace, in diplomatic statements and in algorithms that decide which perspective of the conflict the world hears first. Kashmir has been central to Pakistani military thinking since it gained independence, but today the Kashmir conflict isn’t just limited to the “Line of Control”. It is contested today in UN Chambers, newsroom rundowns and in the social media feeds of people who have never visited either side of Kashmir. Today, defence is multifaceted; you don’t just have to defend the borders; you defend your country at tables, in courtrooms, and in information spaces where national interests are debated.
By what I said above, none should conclude that the military is now irrelevant. It is the epicentre of our diplomatic voice; without a credible and hard-core military, there is no room left for negotiation, only room for loss. The history of Kashmir-linked conflicts tells us exactly why military capability is so important; in 2019, the strike and the counter-strike nearly threw both states into a nuclear conflict, showing restraint depends on capacity rather than sentiments. What military capability cannot address is the underlying political dispute that is producing the conflicts.
Kashmir has never been only a dispute over territory. It is political, because the aspirations of Kashmiris rarely sit at the centre of debates held in their name. It is also legal, shaped by UN Security Council resolutions and by arguments drawn from international humanitarian law, with each side tending to cite the parts that suit its position. And it is a human issue, visible in civilian harm and in the way that harm affects how outside audiences judge claims to legitimacy. A state can have significant military capability and still struggle to turn that into political outcomes if it cannot convince others what is happening and why it matters.
More and more, the dispute is being contested in a space where Pakistan’s performance has been uneven: narrative formation. International news coverage, think-tank writing, diplomatic messaging, and competing readings of history often determine how a crisis is understood long before any negotiation produces results. Pakistan may have defensible legal arguments on certain points, but arguing is not the same thing as presenting it effectively. A weak narrative position does not erase realities on the ground, but it can reduce their political and diplomatic weight. It is not that Islamabad lacks commitment; rather, it has held a firm stance for decades. The gap is sustained, evidence-based communication, and the habit of responding after attention has already moved elsewhere.
A similar pattern appears in Pakistan’s diplomacy. For years, Pakistan has tried to internationalise Kashmir through the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and bilateral channels. At different moments, each forum has offered some room to raise the issue. The harder question is whether this effort has produced lasting external pressure on India. A more effective approach would expand outreach beyond the usual partners and lean more consistently on documented evidence rather than rhetorical assertion. It would also mean more direct engagement with international media and research institutions, instead of relying mainly on embassy statements that tend to receive limited attention outside the region.
There is also an implication that needs to be stated plainly: external credibility is partly tied to domestic practice. A state asking for international backing on political rights, self-determination, and civilian protection in Kashmir needs to be able to point to its own record on comparable principles. This is not meant to dismiss Pakistan’s stated position. It is about the conditions under which that position becomes durable rather than simply declaratory.
One reading of past crises is that Pakistan endured by holding its position on the ground. The more relevant lesson now is wider than that. Security is not just territorial control. It also involves sustaining influence across diplomatic, legal, and informational domains. Military forces at the border still matter, but in a dispute like Kashmir, outcomes may also turn on legal processes, public communication, and the judgments of international audiences who have no direct exposure to the Line of Control.
The author is a research assistant at Kashmir Institute of International Relations.
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