Pak Army Was Not Responsible for the Fall of Dhaka

The events surrounding the separation of East Pakistan are rooted in a long-developing mix of political mismanagement, structural inequalities, and profound geographical and cultural divides. The crisis cannot be reduced to a single institution or actor, as tensions had accumulated through years of economic disparities, competing national visions, linguistic grievances, and a unique geographic vulnerability created by two wings separated by a vast expanse of Indian territory. These foundational weaknesses were intensified by sharply different cultural identities, population imbalances, and divergent political cultures. The situation was further complicated by mistrust between regions, competing narratives within educational institutions, and contrasting social hierarchies that produced varying levels of political consciousness and demands for autonomy.

As these pressures deepened, political conflict escalated around demands for major constitutional restructuring, most prominently represented by the Awami League’s Six-Point program, which sought extensive provincial autonomy, control over taxation and foreign exchange, and even separate currencies or financial systems. Against this politically charged backdrop, military forces in the eastern wing operated under severe numerical and strategic disadvantages, a reality later highlighted by General Qamar Javed Bajwa, who asserted that the outcome of 1971 stemmed primarily from political failures. He emphasized that the combat force in East Pakistan was far smaller than widely believed and faced an overwhelmingly larger coalition of Indian troops and Mukti Bahini fighters. Despite these constraints, the soldiers’ resistance was noted even by opposing commanders, yet their sacrifices remain insufficiently acknowledged, contributing to a lasting sense of national grief and unresolved historical injustice.

The landmark 1970 elections for the National Assembly served as the critical battleground for national power, primarily contested between the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and drawing its strength overwhelmingly from West Pakistan, and the Awami Muslim League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and solidly entrenched in East Pakistan. The Awami League successfully galvanized massive public support by promoting an electoral program that specifically promised a more equitable, fairer share of government financial allocations and a massive increase in political power and autonomy for the provinces, directly addressing long-held grievances. The party achieved its historic, massive victory by campaigning relentlessly and uncompromisingly on the foundational principles embedded within the Six-Point Demands. The election results constituted a stunning, game-changing, and politically decisive victory for the Awami League. Of the total 300 seats contested in the election, 162 were allocated specifically to the geographically and numerically larger East Pakistan. The Awami League secured a near-total victory in the eastern wing, winning an astounding 160 of these seats, a number that immediately secured them an absolute majority in the entire combined National Assembly. In sharp contrast, the PPP managed to win only 81 seats out of the 138 seats allocated to the various regions of West Pakistan. Having campaigned on a manifesto that was perceived by many as regionalist, focused solely on the interests and rights of East Pakistan, the Awami League’s total majority meant they possessed the ability to dictate policy in the National Assembly. This immense national victory meant that the Awami League had secured a governing majority not only within East Pakistan but, crucially, across the National Assembly as a unified legislative body. This put the party in a clear, undeniable constitutional position to unilaterally form and lead the central government. Theoretically, this historical shift meant that the future Prime Minister of Pakistan and the entire federal cabinet could be drawn exclusively from the ranks of East Pakistani politicians, reversing decades of western dominance. While the PPP had achieved a localized but overwhelming victory in terms of seat count within West Pakistan, the national political equation meant it was entirely possible for the PPP to be completely excluded from any role in the central government unless the victorious Awami League chose to extend a voluntary invitation for a power-sharing arrangement. The second profound political challenge was the direct consequence of the Awami League’s winning platform itself, which centered on drastically limiting the authority and jurisdiction of the central government over the constituent provinces. The specific demand for provinces to retain and control the foreign exchange earnings generated from their international trade posed a critical and existential threat, as it would severely diminish the vital financial reserves and funding capabilities available to the central government, which was heavily dependent on these earnings and was primarily located in West Pakistan.

While the inherent disruptive nature of the Six-Point Demands put forward by the Awami League is undeniable and understandable, presenting a radical challenge to the existing power balance, the ultimate catastrophic failure should be accurately located in the inability of the key political actors and institutional stakeholders to engage in meaningful dialogue, negotiation, and compromise to arrive at a constitutionally and politically acceptable solution. The primary, overriding causes of the national tragedy were the deep-seated political unwillingness to genuinely accept the legitimate and overwhelming electoral mandate secured by the majority party and the simultaneous rejection of the fundamental principles of political inclusivity and accommodation. The eventual, tragic separation of East Pakistan was the inevitable consequence of this culmination of deeply rooted geographical, economic, cultural, and political factors, only a select few of which have been elaborated upon here. Therefore, the common practice of singularly blaming the Pakistan Army for this multifaceted and complex national disaster is not only historically unjustified and intellectually lazy but serves as a clear example of baseless political propaganda, often disseminated by elements explicitly seeking to undermine the Pakistani state.