FROM A HEAD TO A HEAD, THROUGH A HEAD: THE GEOPOLITICAL CLIMATE THAT SURROUNDED THE FALL OF DHAKA

India had established a close strategic partnership with the Soviet Union as Nehru introduced his non-aligned policy post-independence. This strategic partnership between the two parties eventually culminated in a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation signed on the eve of war, two months prior to the fall of Dhaka. Bellicose in her stature, Indira Gandhi successfully managed to sway the narrative in line with her ambitions. Her intention was not merely to liberate the people of East Bengal, but also to create a satellite state that would extend India’s sphere of influence across Southeast Asia. India had the naval and military might of the monstrosity that was once the Soviet Union behind it; such support was not limited to military equipment alone, as it was widely reported that the soviets were involved in operational aspects of the naval war as well.

This begs the question of why the state of Pakistan was not able to materialize similar tangible support when it needed it the most, Pakistan had placed itself on the global map prior to the debacle of East Pakistan as it helped the United States cash in on the Sino soviet rift post-De-Stalinization. The USSR had played a keen role in helping establish the communist party of China and then helping said party establish its stronghold over China post the Chinese civil war. The PRC and the USSR were of the same ideological kith and kin, but the changes that occurred in the USSR post the demise of Stalin created animosity between the two states, which later on developed into threats of invasion and potential preemptive nuclear strikes. The United States had remained largely detached from China on the diplomatic front post the Japanese surrender, although it is pertinent to note that the two sides were at arms against one another during the forgotten Korean War.

The national security establishment was mobilized during the Nixon era, courtesy of Henry Kissinger, to cozy up to the PRC in order to balance soviet influence in the region. An attempt was made in Warsaw through an intermediary on Kissinger’s behalf by using the ambassador of the US based out of Warsaw as a conduit to woo the Chinese, such attempts did not materialize due to the then ongoing tension in Vietnam and the wider Indochina region which saw the United states of America and the PRC backing opposing parties to the conflict. The president of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan, later acted as an intermediary between the two states after being asked by Nixon to convey a message to Zhou Enlai at a UN General Assembly meeting in the October of 1970. Henry Kissinger later made a covert trip to China through Pakistan in order to lay the ground for the first visit of an American president to the PRC. Pakistan’s efforts materialized, and the US was able to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Tensions between the two powers persisted, but they came together to put a conclusive end to soviet revanchist designs in Afghanistan. Pakistan, as a complete unit, did not survive to see the day. On paper, the fact that an all-weather strategic partner of China and a member of two American anti soviet pacts was not able to obtain conclusive international support in its favor comes off as utterly appalling.

Nixon was adamant in his support of Pakistan, but the public narrative was to the contrary due to the anti-Vietnam movement, which was slowly transforming into Nixon’s Achilles heel. Nixon had come into office with the promise of settling the Vietnam issue once and for all, but he was not willing to withdraw on

terms that would cause global embarrassment. Delay of the inevitable had resulted in mass protests across segments of American society, especially college campuses. News of the Bengali genocide had reached Western media despite the extensive efforts of the Pakistani government to curtail access to the east. The issue of East Bengal was increasingly being associated with the anti-war Vietnam movement as the guitarist of the band ‘The Beatles’, George Harrison, performed in a concert to raise awareness regarding the war and the refugee issue. India was using its soft power to project a one-sided narrative. Indian artist Ravi Shankar had organized the concert. Americans chided the Indian propelled narrative due to an information gap and a lack of understanding regarding the region as a whole. Nixon, however, persisted and backed Pakistan to the near end. According to an article by Jawed Naqvi published in Dawn, at the height of military action in East Pakistan, Richard Nixon wrote to all his key aides: To all hands, don’t squeeze Yahya at this time.

Richard Nixon was under immense domestic pressure to denounce Pakistan and uphold the Indian narrative. What then propelled Nixon’s resolve to take the masses head-on for Pakistan? The answer to this question would be NSA and Secretary of State: Dr Henry Kissinger. An advocate of a pragmatic approach to geopolitics known as Realpolitik, Kissinger pioneered the policy of détente with the Soviet Union and orchestrated an opening of relations with China. Realpolitik is a system of politics or principles based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations. An example in Question regarding the practice of realpolitik in American corridors of power would be that of the US external policy during the Iran-Iraq war. Publicly siding with Iraq against archrival Iran, the US was also covertly selling arms to Iran in order to obtain funds to support rebels in Nicaragua, and the government was able to supersede a congressional aid ban this way. Opening America up to the PRC was the highlight of Kissinger’s career; the scale of media coverage that he obtained as a consequence of the entire ordeal was such that the president himself was jealous of the former. Pakistan was at the epicenter of Kissinger’s visit to Peking; he was flown in on a PIA airliner, and the sensitivity of the event was such that the foreign secretary himself drove Kissinger to the airbase from where he took off. In realpolitik terms, the American government was willing to look past internal pressure and moral considerations to secure a geostrategic victory via Pakistan.

Pakistan was a party to both SEATO and CENTO when kinetic war officially broke out between two nation-states on the 3^rd of December 1971; both of the treaties in question vowed American military assistance against aggression by a communist state, but the supply of said aid was subject to certain conditions. Pakistan had faced immense domestic backlash when it first became a signatory to CENTO. The treaty in question was designed to contain Nasser of Egypt, who enjoyed the support of the masses across the Muslim world and Pakistan alike in light of his Arab revivalist movement. International alliances are ever-changing, and the Cold War was an inherently complex era. India was a state that was not aligned with either bloc in the global conflict but had gone to war with China in 1962. The Kennedy administration ended up airlifting military equipment to India day in and day out during the Indo-Sino war to take on the Red Scare in the Himalayas. Pakistan expected military aid from the United States at the advent of war in 1965, but instead, it was faced with the blockade of military aid. The Americans did not consider the Indians to be a communist threat, and the invocation of the two treaties in question was subject to this condition; instead, India was thought of as a victim of belligerence propelled by the communist bloc. The situation was significantly different when Pakistan was once again at war with its neighbor six years later. The differentiating lines had grown to become more visible as the conflict became a part of Cold War proper. India had entered into a treaty with the Soviet Union.

It would be unfair to claim that Pakistan did not receive military support from the United States altogether. Nixon ordered for the use of gunboat diplomacy to coerce India into a ceasefire agreement; a task force of the Seventh Fleet, led by USS Enterprise, was moved to the Bay of Bengal to that end. On the 10^th of December 1971, Beijing’s first ambassador to the UN warned Henry Kissinger that the PRC would not remain quiescent if the ensuing military trends were to continue. Both sides to the conflict eventually agreed to a ceasefire agreement on the 16^th December 1971, at least in part as a response to Nixon’s appeal. The potential disintegration of Pakistan so shortly after having facilitated the United States’ opening up to the PRC would’ve sabotaged what was to become the biggest diplomatic achievement of Nixon’s administration. The conflict was confined to the region until the USSR attempted to alter with the balance of power in South East Asia by significantly ramping up military aid to India, hence internationalizing the conflict.

Pakistan received diplomatic support from both the United States and China, but tangible military aid was negligible. It is pertinent to note, however, that consistent Chinese threats of military action and the use of gunboat diplomacy by the United States had successfully coerced India into accepting the status quo on the western front. The East Pakistan debacle continues to haunt the corridors of power in Islamabad to this day. The diplomatic aspect of the war is a stark reminder of how the support of allies alone will not suffice in helping us hold our ground in external conflicts. The Eastern command under General A.A.K. Niazi was certain that the American fleet would engage the Indian navy and bring in supplies, but that materialized to no end as the entire gunboat exercise was meant to do no other thing than act as a psychological tactic to set the ground for a ceasefire. Pakistan creating bridges between the two great powers, hence acted as a Quid pro Quo in obtaining unwavering support from an American government that was under pressure. Today, the tables have turned as Pakistan received tangible military support from China, and India’s apparent ally expressed neutrality and embarrassed it on the international stage by warming up to Pakistan in one too many ways after the four-day war. Pakistan must continue to vouch for peace and attempt to build bridges between the powers that be in order to navigate its way through the ever-changing world of geopolitics. If emerging geopolitical events have taught us anything, it is that diplomatic modus operandi has been reduced to wooing Donald Trump. Can Pakistan bring Xi Jinping and Donald Trump together like it once brought Nixon and Mao together to ease tensions on the kinetic and the non-kinetic front? There are massive economic and strategic dividends to reap if Pakistan is to repeat history once again, from a head to a head through a head. 

Citations:

Aijazuddin, F. S. (2001). From a head, through a head to a head: The Secret Channel between the US and China through Pakistan. Oxford University Press.

Kissinger, H., & Greenfield, J. (2014a). Henry Kissinger: World order.

JFK’s forgotten crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-indian war: Riedel, Bruce (n.d.).

https://www.dawn.com/news/73729/don-t-squeeze-yahya-khan-nixon-told-aides-in-1971

16 December, Report, T., Shankar, – Ravi, & Harrison, – George. (2020, December 16). Theconcert for bangladesh: How music influenced the war. The Business Standard.

https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/victory-day/concert-bangladesh-how-music-influenced-war-172534