Development, Kashmir, and the Question of Consent: A Settler Colonial Agenda after 2019

Written by: Muhammad Faiz ur Rehman, Research Intern at Center for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

It is widely believed in policy circles that if economic incentives are provided to the people in conflict regions, then it becomes very unlikely for them to turn back to violence. This is, however, a very complex political process, because short-term economic interventions to curb the deep-rooted political unrest may simply “paper over the cracks”. In the absence of certain political and context-specific analysis, these incentives can reinforce conflicts. This article will analyse how administrative re-structuring after 2019, under the guise of development, is actually a “settler colonial project” to control and remove Kashmir’s autonomy.

To seriously examine this colonial logic, one must begin with August 2019, when India deployed an additional 35,000 troops in the region, suspended civil mobility and revoked Articles 370 and 35 A of its constitution. This resulted in the seizure of Jammu and Kashmir’s statehood and special autonomous status; the region was demarcated into two union territories, Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, essentially putting the region under the direct control of New Delhi. Since 1953, Article 370 had been reduced to an “empty husk” through a series of legislations, but this act formally ended its very symbolic existence. Article 35A, however, vested Kashmir’s legislative assembly with sole authority to define “permanent residents”. Providing practical limitations to any change in land ownership and residency.

Immediately after this constitutional change, an indefinite curfew was implemented, followed by a complete communication blackout. Members of civil society, academics, and political leaders across the region were held under preventive detention laws such as the Public Safety Act. Some were still held captive even after courts ordered their release. Kashmir faced severe internet outages even when it was essential during Covid-19; in February 2021, the restoration took place in phases making the region to last for 18 months without internet and phone communication.

International media also showed concern over the situation. Al Jazeera described it as the “darkest day in the history of Jammu and Kashmir”, Bloomberg looked at it as “A Shocking Decision”, CNN termed it as a “Big historical blunder”, and TRT was also concerned about the illegal removal of the J&K’s special status, while the Los Angeles Times highlighted this as the loss of Kashmir’s autonomy. These concerns were not limited to the regional politics; they were focused on civil liberties and the long-term risks involved in using force to govern a disputed region. Amnesty International and the United Nations also showed concern that these extended restrictions could worsen the human rights situation. They have documented use of force, arbitrary detentions, and provision of legal immunity to the military personnel in Indian administered Kashmir.

India stages this act as a necessary measure. The government said that the change in special status was necessary to curb corruption, violence, and underdevelopment, and a tight central control would remove such problems and help bring peace and stability in the region. However, this argument is opposite to the evidences. The Indian government later announced a new domicile law, which allows citizens from outside the Kashmir to acquire domicile status and lay claim to the land and government jobs in the region. These developments signal the arrival of settler colonialism to marginalize the majority Muslim population in Indian administered Kashmir.

Colonial powers justified such domination as a civilizing mission, arguing that progress needs authority. Development plays a similar role in Jammu and Kashmir today. Political rights are compared with the economic incentives, believing that building roads and infrastructure can replace respect and representation. Similarly, policy research found that in a conflict zone, if economic incentives are decoupled from meaningful political engagement than they are unlikely to address the root cause of the disputes. The same development approach can be seen in Northern Ireland before the Good Friday agreement and in Palestine today.

However, The legal basis of the dispute did not change. In 1948 United Nations Security Council established a UN commission for India and Pakistan, adopting Resolution 47, which calls for a plebiscite in which the Kashmiri people could determine their own future. These resolutions have not been withdrawn, nor have any other settlements replaced them.

Post 2019 governance model portrays that this development is less of a political process and more of an administrative exercise. For instance, Tourism campaigns, infrastructure development are portrayed as the indicators of success. Yet, the political mobilization remain constraint, public life is shaped through the detention laws. Development in any way without consent is not a solution at all. Peace built on surveillance is temporary. Sustainable stability of Kashmir is dependent on accountability, political engagement, and the respect of the people whose future is at stake.

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